This paper examines some competing views on currency regime choice by applying the dynamic multi state Markov (MSM) model to the regime transitions of 166 countries from 1980 to 1999. The findings suggest that the bipolar view is valid only in the long run and for a reason quite different from what the proponents had imagined, namely, economic development rather than crisis driven exits. The estimated steady state probabilities even predict that a unipolar fixed exchange rate system could emerge in the long run. Despite some divergence, both and regime data corroborate the key findings.
"…….contingent policy rules to hit explicit exchange rate targets will no longer be viable in the twenty first century……[Countries]….will be forced to choose between floating exchange rates on the one hand and monetary unification on the other." Eichengreen (1994) , pp. 4 5.
The bipolar view, which became popular in the 1990s, considers all exchange rate regimes other than completely fixed and freely floating as unsustainable 1 . Advocates of the bipolar view argue that greater exposure to global capital markets makes intermediate exchange rate regimes such as adjustable peg, crawling peg and crawling band susceptible to speculative attacks. Countries will be forced to move to the corners, either to a fixed regime such as currency union, currency board or dollarization, or to a freely floating regime (Eichengreen, 1994; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; Summers, 2000) . The bipolar view is also consistent with the % ( . This doctrine states that a country must give up one of the three goals: exchange rate stability, monetary independence and financial market integration, that is, a country cannot have all three simultaneously.
The proponents of the bipolar view claim that an intermediate regime will be hollowed out over time as a result of involuntary transitions, particularly for a crisis 2 . The view was rapidly adopted by the financial establishments as the "new conventional wisdom" (Frankel, 2003) after the Asian crisis in 1997 98 with a view to "reform financial architecture" so as to minimize the frequency and severity of crises in the future. As a result, as Eichengreen (1994) anticipated, the distribution of currency regimes will take a bipolar form in the 21 st century. This paper, therefore, aims to examine the validity of the claim in a thorough empirical investigation. (Hernandez and Montiel, 2003) .
On the other hand, the currency union was adopted voluntarily by European countries in 1999
with preceding preparations done in steps, such as the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System, and its predecessor, the Snake.
Therefore, both voluntary and involuntary transitions can happen toward the poles, which seem contradictory with the claim of the proponents of the bipolar view. It is therefore asked in this paper, is the bipolar view likely to be valid for crises, as mentioned by the proponents, or could it be valid for different reasons? To answer this question, the dynamics of currency regime transitions of 166 countries are studied for the period 1980 99 using both and data ! .
The paper examines whether the distribution of exchange rate regimes tends to converge to the polar extremes and identify factors that increase the likelihood of convergence. Two recent studies provide evidence against the bipolar view. Masson (2001) is the first study which cast a light on the hollowing out hypothesis directly and showed that there are non zero transition probabilities to intermediate regimes, implying that the bipolar view is not correct strictly. However, it did not study the causes. In another study, Masson and Ruge Murcia (2005) endogenize the exchange rate regime transitions to show that inflation and, to a lesser extent, output growth and trade openness can explain regime transitions, but not necessarily toward the bipolar direction.
Although significant contributions, it is not clear from these studies whether the view may gain some validity from a long run perspective and for the reasons mentioned by its proponents, the main one being crises. Our analysis departs from the above studies in two important ways.
First, while the strict definition of the view (i.e. no transition toward intermediate regime) is not supported by data (Masson, 2001) , this study proposes an alternative test involving a weaker definition of the view by allowing some transitions toward the intermediate regime. The proposed approach has made it possible to explore a broader scope of the view instead of its narrow scope under the strict rule. Second, and more importantly, this study tests the view by analyzing the effects of crisis and developmental stage directly on the regime transition dynamics, which was not done in earlier studies.
The primary antecedents of choosing explanatory variables, "crisis" and "developmental stage" are found in the literature of involuntary and voluntary regime choice models, such as the currency crisis models and optimum currency area (OCA) models, respectively (see Masson and Ruge Murcia, 2005; Poirson, 2001 find from the estimates that there is high probability for relatively developed countries to adopt a fixed regime in the long run. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) . / classifications are published by the IMF. 7 Note that the 'freely falling' category of the RR classification is lumped, in most cases, into the freely floating category, and sometimes it is placed under managed floating on the basis of other information gathered by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) . 8 Until 1999, countries were obliged to report their exchange rate regime to the IMF according to three categories: fixed (both hard fixes and conventional pegs), limited flexible regimes (other soft pegs) and freely floating. From 1999, the IMF asks countries to report their exchange rate regimes according to eight categories to overcome the limitations of old coarse classification system. perhaps due to high exchange rate volatility, crises and episodes of high inflation. On the other hand, the percentage of intermediate that was floating in practice has decreased in the 1990s (using BOR, 26 percent in the 1980s and 18 percent in the 1990s; and 14 percent according to RR). These are perhaps the cases of inadvertent floating in the face of political or financial crises. From the trend in both types of divergence, it may be argued that the fear of floating has increased over time.
Another type of divergence, one that is particularly relevant to measurement error, is that among classification schemes. The estimated proportion of the observed differences between regimes is shown in Table 2 It is therefore necessary to recognize the possibility that the proportion of divergence is slightly overestimated due to misclassification in regime classifications. To deal with the probability of misclassification in classification systems, this study introduces the Hidden Markov model in Section 5.
To conclude, the findings in this section show that the divergence between and regime classifications and among the classifications is not negligible. Thus, the and two classifications are used in the analysis for robustness of the results. Table A1 in Appendix I). The rest are then defined as developing countries. To identify the factors that may facilitate transitions toward the bipolar direction, variables suggested by the competing paradigms of regime choice can be considered as explanatory variables. The focus of this study is primarily on the variables that are suggested by the proponents of the bipolar view. These proponents argue that capital integration will make intermediate regimes susceptible to speculative attacks and countries will therefore be forced to adopt a corner regime. Hence, according to them, capital integration and crises are the potential reasons for transition toward the bipolar direction. Since capital integration is not found significant in this study (see Table 3 Table 3 for the 1990s. Table 3 shows that trade openness and high inflation increase the probability of a flexible regime. This finding is consistent with many studies including Masson and Ruge Murcia (2005) .
However, per capita GDP growth, a proxy for economic development, is not found to be significant to explain regime transitions. Traditionally, per capita GDP growth is used as a proxy of economic development, which is a rough indicator of economic development. The coefficient on capital control dummy is not significant on regime transition, indicating that the argument of the proponents of the bipolar view that capital integration may lead countries to abandon the intermediate regime is not supported by data. Therefore, rather than these macroeconomic fundamentals, exogenous structural features of an economy, such as developmental stage and crisis are used to explain regime transition dynamics in the following sub section.
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The dynamics of currency regime transition towards fixed and floating corner is examined by estimating the transition intensity rates λˆ2 1 , λˆ1 2 , λˆ2 3 and λˆ3 2 in Panel A of Tables 4 and 5 with the effect of developmental stage and crisis. Panel B of the tables 4 and 5 gives estimates of the coefficients of explanatory variables on regime transitions. The results are reported in Table   4 for the 1980s and in Table 5 for the 1990s. rather it can be considered a factor of short term regime transition dynamics. A noteworthy finding is that less developed countries often tend to switch to a more rigid regime at the advent of a crisis, implying that crisis cannot be an imperative toward hollowing out of intermediate regimes. This finding is also contrary to the predictions of the so called first generation model (Krugman, 1979 ) and second generation model (Obstfeld, 1996) of currency crises 12 . Perhaps, the countries' tendency to adopt a fixed regime at the time of crisis is associated with the state of vulnerability of their financial sectors.
It should also be noted that despite a considerable amount of divergence among regime classifications (as shown in Section 2), the key results do not substantially vary. This indicates that the divergence characterized largely by short term regime dynamics does not matter for long term regime trends.
To sum up, estimates of transition intensities suggest that the "fixed corner" is satisfied, but the "floating corner" is not satisfied for the period under consideration, which rejects the bipolar view even under the weaker definition given in this study. However, by analyzing the causes of transitions, it is found that the bipolar view will likely to be valid during later stages of development. When countries reach a high level of development, which is also correlated, , with high capital integration, they tend to switch to either a fixed or a floating regime and sustain it. Intermediate regimes remain viable for less developed countries, at least for the short run. The empirical findings reveal that support for the bipolar view is relatively weak in the 1980s compared to the 1990s, indicating a decade dependency in the regime transitions process.
It is worth noting, however, that the 1990s was marked by higher levels of economic development as many countries entered into the emerging category, increased capital market integration and global shocks that make intermediate regimes unsustainable to some extent. If this pattern continues, the validity of the bipolar view will be more pronounced in the foreseeable future.
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In this section the Hidden Markov model is applied to the regime classification data sets to obtain estimates of transition intensities controlling for the probability of misclassification. In the Hidden Markov model, the true regimes (or states) of the Markov chain are not observed. The observed regimes are governed by some probability distribution (the emission distribution) conditional on the unobserved regimes. For example, the observed states O i are generated conditionally on the true states S i according to a misclassification matrix E = (e rs ) n×n , where e rs = Pr (O(t) = s | S(t) = r), and is assumed to be independent of 13 .
To investigate the effect of explanatory variables z(t) for the probability of misclassification e rs for each pair of states r and s, a logistic model can be used,
Log (e rs /(1 e rs )) = γ T rs z(t). 13 The quality of a diagnostic test (sensitivity and specificity) is often measured by probabilities that the true and observed states are equal, Pr (O i (t) = | S i (t) = ).
Here a direct method is applied to calculate likelihoods in continuous time based on matrix products, following the method developed by Macdonald and Zucchini (1997) and Guttorp (1995) .
The estimated misclassification probabilities are reported in Table 6 . The sample period considered for the HMM is 1990 99. The estimates in Table 6 show that the probability for misclassifying a floating regime as an intermediate regime and vice versa is around 0.04, which is slightly higher than the probability of misclassifying the other regime.
The estimated transition intensities and coefficients of covariates are reported in Table 7 . The findings in this section using the HMM support the findings of the previous section strongly.
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Since the probabilities of adopting regimes may change over time as a result of various events, such as capital mobility or crises in the future, current distribution of regimes may not be the same as the long run one. Therefore, we ask: what would be the long run distribution of exchange rate regimes? This section explores answer of this question by estimating the long run probability distribution (also known as invariant or steady state distribution) of regimes under the MSM. The estimates are reported in Table 8 . The estimates of long run probabilities suggest that a unipolar fixed exchange rate system might emerge in the long run as there is a high probability for adopting fixed regime among relatively developed countries. This prediction comes from recent trends of countries adopting currency union, currency boards and dollarization.
It is thus reasonable to argue that the looser definition that is taken in this study does not contradict much with the spirit of the original view. Hence, if we take a nuanced view of the way policies tend to work, a looser definition of the bipolar view might be appropriate. and variance change over time, the nature of the optimal exchange rate regime is expected to vary correspondingly, leading to an evolution of exchange rate regime. Therefore, the new equilibrium position of the economy leads to an evolution of an exchange rate regime. This can be true in a crisis situation when some countries change their regime and again return to the previous regime after the crisis. This gives rise to a Markov model, which assumes that the probability of transition to an alternative regime depends only on the current regime irrespective of past history. Masson (2001) argues that although the Markov assumption appears to be somewhat restrictive, as a first approximation, it would seem to be an adequate framework for examining exchange rate regime transitions as "it supposes that a typical currency will face the same likelihood that some shock will push it to an alternative regime" (p. 573).
The elements of the matrix Γ , λ ij 's are defined in ( 
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A general method for evaluating the likelihood for a multi state Markov model in continuous time, applicable to any form of transition is discussed here (for details, see Kalbfleisch and Lawless, 1985; Kay, 1986) . The likelihood is calculated from the transition probability matrix -(t). The likelihood function is the product of all individual contributions and the total contribution of an individual country to the likelihood function is the result of the product of the contribution from each observed transition.
For a country ., the likelihood function is formulated as: The maximum likelihood estimates of θ = (λ,β) can be obtained by maximizing the log likelihood, and applying any of the iterative procedures such as the quasi Newton algorithm or Nelder Mead simplex based algorithm. The MSM model is estimated in this paper using the "msm" package of + software.
